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In this intellectually challenging and rewarding treatise, Martin Holbraad sets out to do for 
‘truth’ something similar to but ultimately different from what Roy Wagner (1981) did for 
‘culture’, namely, subject it to the transformative impact of ethnographic alterity and explore 
the consequences for anthropology. 
Holbraad’s core argument unfolds in three main movements. First, he contends that 
the divinatory verdicts of babalawos, the expert practitioners of Ifá divination in Cuba, defy 
representational notions of truth (that is, truth as the accurate depiction of stable real-world 
referents). This failure of representational truth, he then suggests, prompts him as 
ethnographer to conceptualize a new kind of truth—a motile truth that babalawos 
continuously innovate by mediating transformative collisions between the life paths of their 
consultants and the mythic paths of Ifá divinities. Holbraad then asks to what extent such 
ethnographically motivated conceptual innovations are indicative of an analogy between 
anthropology and divination. 
There are many ancillary elements to the rigorous exposition in this book; here, 
however, I limit my discussion to two key aspects. First, I further elaborate the three main 
movements of Holbraad’s complex argumentation, which—because it recurs to and seeks to 
renovate the premises of anthropology—he terms a “recursive analysis.” Second, I question 
  
why Holbraad appears finally to short-circuit the full recursive implications of his thought-
provoking insights. 
Recursive analysis begins for anthropologists, according to Holbraad, whenever we 
encounter alterity, defined as that which our representational notion of truth cannot 
characterize without either imputing irrationality to our ethnographic interlocutors or 
resorting to the language of contradiction. Examples might include: the once commonplace 
assertion that practitioners of so-called primitive religions ‘confuse’ holiness and pollution, 
descriptions of mythological figures as ‘ambiguous’ because they display seemingly 
incompatible attributes, or my own claim that there is what I term a ‘tension’ between images 
of ontological autonomy and images of underlying identity among the Arosi matrilineages of 
the island of Makira in Solomon Islands. 
This means, in other words, that for Holbraad the problem of alterity is a 
transformation of the classic problem of “primitive mentality” in the study of religion. 
Alterity, like “primitive mentality” according to Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1926: 78), may be 
detected by any apparent violation of the law of noncontradiction, the representationalist 
logic that says no two mutually exclusive predicates can be simultaneously true of the same 
subject. A shrine cannot be both holy and polluting; a deity cannot be both child-like and a 
fierce warrior; Arosi matrilineages cannot be both autonomous and in some way ingredient to 
one another. It eventually emerges, however, that Holbraad does not simply correlate this 
alterity with an inverse “law of participation”; rather, informed by Eduardo Viveiros de 
Castro’s Deleuzian account of Amerindian cosmogonic myth, he suggests that it is indicative 
of an ontology of heterogenic continuity, a relational ontology of intensive and extensive 
multiplicity. It likewise emerges that the representational truth that runs up against alterity 
indexes a contrasting ontology of discontinuity, an essentialist ontology that puts entities 
  
before relations. The anthropologist’s experience of alterity is thus cast, not in terms of two 
types of mentality, but in terms of “ontological divergence” (p. 254). 
In Holbraad’s encounter with Ifá divination, the ethnographic particularity that flags 
alterity is the phenomenon of divinatory verdicts. Holbraad is at pains to demonstrate that the 
verdicts of babalawos are phenomena that representational truth can only describe as 
impossible or absurd. The realist essentialist principles underpinning representational truth 
dictate that every truth claim is subject to doubt; there is always the possibility that the truth 
claim is not an accurate copy of reality. But practitioners of Ifá divination treat the verdicts of 
babalawos as truth claims that are indubitable, thus assigning two mutually exclusive 
predicates (true and indubitable) to the same subject (verdicts). Such verdicts as “you are 
bewitched,” “your guardian oricha [divinity] is Changó,” or “you have a tendency to 
impotence” are all, from a representationalist perspective, patently subject to doubt. Within 
Ifá, however, they are not, provided they have been delivered by an authentic babalawo. 
Having thus met with the Ifá equivalent of “twins are birds,” Holbraad proceeds to the 
second, most intensively ethnographic, phase of his recursive project. Rather than asking, 
How can Ifá practitioners believe that verdicts are both true and indubitable? he asks, What 
kind of truth would verdicts have to be in order to be indubitable? Holbraad acknowledges 
that philosophical speculation alone can conceptualize the motile truth he posits in answer to 
this question, yet his aim is to show that anthropology offers uniquely powerful methods for 
precipitating and addressing such problems. To that end, he takes the reader deep inside the 
workings of Ifá divination in search of the kind of truth that transpires there. 
Some readers will deem Holbraad’s ethnographic focus on a few babalawos and their 
ritual consultations too narrow and insufficiently contextualized within various scales of 
contemporary Cuban life. This book is probably not the place to begin one’s study of Cuba or 
Afro-Caribbean religion. But, with a wink at Clifford Geertz, Holbraad proposes that, by 
  
“thinning out” rather than thickening his description of divination (p. 85), he is able to 
observe the problem of truth at its center. As Bruno Latour might say, he purifies divination, 
isolating it in a kind of experimental vacuum chamber in order to detect the kind of truth that 
is the condition for the possibility of indubitable verdicts. 
Based on a detailed account of the rituals of Ifá divination, Holbraad seeks to show 
that these rituals support a Deleuzian analysis of Ifá cosmology. In this project he 
acknowledges his debt to Marcio Goldman’s Deleuzian account of Afro-Brazilian 
cosmologies and Viveiros de Castro’s Deleuze-inflected theory of perspectival animism. 
Holbraad infers that the dynamics of Ifá divination necessitate the conclusion that Ifá 
cosmology is predicated on something like Deleuze’s concept of the ‘virtual’, an underlying 
plane of “self-differentiating relations” (p. 164), or fractal multiplicity. Entities in the Ifá 
cosmos are diverse actualizations of this virtuality and are thus intrinsically pre-related; they 
inhere in all possible relations and all possible relations inhere in them. Quoting Viveiros de 
Castro’s (2007: 158) claim that the ontology posited in Amerindian cosmogonic myth is “a 
heterogenic continuum, where transformation is anterior to form, relation is superior to term, 
and interval is interior to being,” Holbraad accepts this account as applicable to Ifá ontology 
but adds the further dimension that motion is prior to rest. 
Ifá cosmology thus entails a “motile ontology” such that every entity that exists is not 
a self-identical static form but a self-differentiating motile trajectory, or path of becoming. 
This is true of divinities as well as people; the gods of Ifá cosmology are “vectors of 
ontological transformation” (p. xxii). And the universal mechanism of change—the means by 
which new motile trajectories come into being—is collision, the generative intersection 
between paths as conditioned by all previous intersections. Truth, therefore, is likewise 
motile. Truth becomes. Truth is a verb, not a substantive. 
  
The work of babalawos, according to Holbraad, indexes this motile ontology and 
effects this motile truth, par excellence, for the work of babalawos is precisely to mediate 
new generative collisions. The crux of any divinatory consultation is the interpretive process 
whereby a babalawo brings the oddu—the mythic path—of a particular divinity into 
conjunction with the life path of a consultant. The indubitable verdict is therefore not a 
statement of pre-existent fact, but an innovative insight, the actualization of something 
previously only potential. Divination transforms the consultant ontologically, remaking her or 
him into a path in whom the mythically informed verdict of the babalawo is newly integral. 
Babalawos refer to this interpretive mode as “metamorphosis” (p. 189), but Holbraad gives it 
his own neologism: he terms this form of truthing “infinition,” the theoretically limitless 
production of ontologically efficacious “inventive definitions” (p. 220). 
By this point, the upshot of the final recursive movement of the analysis seems, as 
Holbraad says, “predictable”: anthropologists, like diviners, are “in the business of infinition” 
(p. 238). Yet as soon as Holbraad articulates this analogy between diviners and 
anthropologists, he begins to qualify it in ways that seem surprisingly to block the 
implications of his own analysis of motile ontology from flowing in ethnographically and 
politically problematic directions. 
Holbraad concludes that divinatory and anthropological infinitions are both 
unidirectionally curtailed with respect to their ontological efficacy; each is able to transform 
some but not other kinds of things. In the case of babalawos, Holbraad allows that the 
verdicts they infine when they bring the mythical paths of the gods into collision with the life 
paths of their clients transform the latter, but he avers that it would be “a cosmological non 
sequitur” (p. 257) for the babalawos to imagine that these verdicts also transform the gods. In 
the case of anthropologists, he allows that the concepts (such as motile truth) that they infine 
when their lives collide with ethnographic others constitute new realities that become integral 
  
to the anthropologists who conceive them, but he disavows as “a kind of radical conceptual 
colonialism” (p. 259) the possibility that these concepts in any way redefine or become 
integral to ethnographic others. 
But both these occlusions of motile truth feel arbitrary and at odds with the preceding 
discussion. First, without necessarily endorsing such reliance on Deleuze, I would note that, 
to the extent that Ifá gods are at all actual rather than indistinguishable from the virtual-in-
itself, they must still be unfolding as motile trajectories and therefore susceptible to ongoing 
transformation via collision. They may be so close to virtuality that the motile/static binary 
nearly vanishes in them, yet an ontology of motile multiplicity would seem to demand that a 
divinatory verdict such as “your guardian oricha [divinity] is Changó” changes Changó as 
well as the client—whether or not babalawos acknowledge this. Either that, or the babalawos 
have infined that which is, according to Holbraad (pp. 113-114, 129), alter to their own 
motile ontology of continuity, namely radically transcendent gods that cannot be transformed. 
And second, it seems to me that once alterity has prompted an anthropologist to infine motile 
truth, it is difficult to put that genie back in the bottle. At points, Holbraad intimates that 
representational thinking presupposes motile ontology and truth as “hidden premises” (p. 
209), latent realities made manifest by alterity. Once infined, therefore, these premises have a 
tendency to take over and hierarchically encompass essentialism and its representational truth 
regime. If, as Holbraad suggests in passing, the motile trajectories of two persons and their 
ideas are mutually transformed in the quotidian collision of ordinary conversation, can we 
escape the conclusion that the relationship between anthropologist and ethnographic 
interlocutors is likewise mutually transforming? Either that, or it is recursive anthropology 
that ends by (re)inventing transcendence, positing ethnographic others as like immutable gods 
(compare pp. 258-259). 
  
Why, then, does Holbraad seek selectively to dam the flow of the motile truth he has 
infined? Holbraad provides at least two clues to his motivation. In his opening discussion of 
Wagner’s recursive analysis of the culture concept, he points out that Wagner could be said to 
give ‘truth’ to the Daribi (p. 47). Wagner, in other words, endorses as truth the Daribi 
understanding of culture as invention and uses it to correct the anthropological error of 
treating culture as convention. Holbraad does not want to appear similarly to give truth to 
babalawos. He does not want to be read as saying that motile truth is true and should replace 
the error of representational truth. This, after all, would be a representational truth claim. But, 
arguably, such an eschewal of representation is itself an endorsement of or bid to inhabit 
motility. More importantly, perhaps, Holbraad clearly aspires to fulfil Viveiros de Castro’s 
(2011: 128) mandate that anthropology be “a practice for the permanent decolonization of 
thought.” Accordingly, he denies that his conceptualizations ever really intersect with and 
impinge on the becoming of the ethnographic others with whom he worked. In this way he 
hopes to achieve a recursive anthropology with no ontological footprint in the fieldwork 
context. 
Whether or not one is persuaded that such a low-impact anthropology is possible, this 
book forces the reader to wrestle earnestly with this and many other difficult and intriguing 
questions. Is my experience of reading this book a collision of motile trajectories? If so, how 
has it redefined me? Is this review an infinition that transforms the book, or have I infined a 
whole new book? This project will not appeal to everyone. Readers whose trajectories have 
not previously collided with the ontological turn and its engagement with continental 
philosophy may find it obscure. But for those who have participated in and followed these 
developments with interest, this book is a major new outgrowth of that impetus. Its distinctive 
twists and turns will be controversial and will generate many transformative debates. Some 
  
might even call Truth in Motion brilliant; for, like the best works in any discipline, its 
creativity moves the creativity of the reader in new and exciting directions. 
 
Michael W. Scott 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
References 
Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien. 1926. How Natives Think. Trans. Lilian A. Clare. London: George Allen 
and Unwin.  
Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. 2007. “The Crystal Forest: Notes on the Ontology of 
Amazonian Spirits.” Inner Asia 9 (2): 153–172. 
Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. 2011. “Zeno and the Art of Anthropology: Of Lies, Beliefs, 
Paradoxes and Other Truths.” Trans. Antonia Walford. Common Knowledge 17 (1): 
128–145. 
Wagner, Roy. 1981. The Invention of Culture. Revised and expanded ed. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
